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The “Lion of the North,” Gustavus Adolphus II, created the true northern lion by 
systematically reforming Sweden’s military system in the 17th century.  The changes 
that he made to the Swedish military led to their success on the battlefield against 
larger forces, such as the Holy Roman Empire.  These reforms would later 
contribute to Sweden’s victory during the Thirty Years War. 
 
 
 
An army is a group of fighters suited for battle on land; however, the attributes that 
define a winning army go far beyond persons suited for battle.  A successful army 
needs discipline, tactical flexibility, professional officers, high morale, and esprit 
de corps.  During the 17th century, Swedish monarch Gustavus Adolphus II was 
inspired to reform the Swedish military after being influenced by Roman tactical 
manuals and the advancements of the United Provinces’ citizen army.  These 
reforms would later grant the Swedish military victory on the battlefield until his 
death in 1632.  Adolphus II recognised that that his military need to be flexible and 
powerful; to do this he needed to maximize the offensive capability of his forces 
and utilize the technology available.  Eventually, his reforms improved his 
military’s discipline and esprit de corps.  
 
 Gustavus Adolphus II created a professional soldiery and officer corps that had the 
discipline and esprit de corps to win battles.  Adolphus II was a religious man who 
envisioned himself as the protector of Protestantism.  He went to a war, the “chief 
object of which [was] to free [his] oppressed brothers in faith from the clutches of 
the pope.”1  Moreover, he was the protector of important ports and trading centers 
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along the Baltic Sea.  In order to protect his religious brethren and territory he 
envisioned a unified Protestant army.  This contrasts with the common employment 
of mercenary forces who were diverse in origin, religion, and loyal only to their 
pay.  To achieve the professional force that Adolphus II envisioned he expanded 
Sweden's old levy system, turning it from a national draft into a more volunteer 
orientated recruitment system.2  The new system allowed professional soldiers to 
develop their craft, as well as their identity through regular pay and drills; it was 
also easier to establish a genuine sense of esprit de corps in a professional army.  
Furthermore, Adolphus II integrated mercenary companies into the Swedish 
military.  He was able to hire the mercenaries for extended periods of time, as well 
as holding them to the same standard as his national soldiers; this increased the 
army standards, which led to an increase in discipline, and personally motivated 
well-trained soldiers.  Adolphus II demanded that the officer corps was properly 
educated in the art of war; he also required the officers to improve their martial 
prowess, and study military history and Roman tactical manuals.  This change gave 
officers the independence they needed to be more flexible and resilient.   
 
The effect of the reforms can be seen in Adolphus II's confidence in his country's 
military ability.  In 1630, when addressing the military class, Adolphus II 
proclaimed that the military spirit of the Goths of antiquity had “shone forth again 
in your manly behaviour, your unfailing courage” that their descendants would 
revere their “might at arms, and great conquests.”3  Furthermore, he sought decisive 
battles, suggesting that he had confidence that his army was superior.  Adolphus 
II’s reforms were able to showcase his army’s true effectiveness when the 
professional officers were able to win the battle of Lutzen after losing their 
monarch.  The effects of Adolphus II's reforms are further exemplified in the 
discipline, unity, and desire to fight displayed by the ethnically diverse Swedish 
army which was a result of his efforts to unify the army into a cohesive fighting 
force.  Improving the officer professionalism, army unity, and cohesion helped win 
the Swedes battles before and after Adolphus II's death; however, it was his changes 
to the army’s tactical structure that made it a weapon of annihilation.  
 
The changes Gustavus Adolphus II made to his army’s tactical structure maximized 
its mobility and offensive capability.  The shift to a more offensive and mobile army 
was a response to the mostly defensive fighting styles of the time, which were 
Tercio infantry formations and the cavalry caracole.  In 1631, The Tercios at the 
battle of Breitenfield were roughly fifteen hundred man, strong muskets, and pike 
diamonds; it was a massive formation that was incredibly difficult to break, yet it 
was very slow to maneuver and lacked offensive capability.4  In the caracole, 
cavalry acted as skirmishers, shooting and retreating in ranks to maintain regular 
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fire.  Both these formations were hampered by the primitive quality of firearms they 
employed as their primary offensive weapons and the over-complexity of their 
firearm drills.  Sweden was able exploit the weakness of their contemporary 
opponents by reforming the military’s tactical structure.   Their units were able to 
increase their mobility by imitating the flexibility and unit size of the Roman cohort 
which consisted of roughly five hundred men.  This proved crucial in the battle of 
Breitenfield.  Military historian Russel Weigly notes that because of the increased 
flexibility and discipline of Swedish forces they had “a capacity unparalled since 
the Romans to react promptly to battlefield emergencies.”5  Standing in stark 
contrast to the Imperial Tercios ⸺ which were too slow to exploit the opportunity 
created by the Saxon route ⸺ the Swedish forces could fill in the gaps of their line 
faster than the Imperials because of their unit size.  Adolphus II took the Swedish 
army through several reforms to make it more capable on the offensive.  Primarily, 
the use of mass pike charges and the triple line single salvo of musket fire, the 
“Swedish Salvee,” delivered shock infantry tactics.6  The Swedish cavalry 
increased its effectiveness by combining pistol fire with a direct sword drawn 
cavalry charge.  On both the left and right flanks of the battle of Breitenfield, the 
effectiveness of Adolphus II's military reform is illustrated.  On the left flank, the 
use of repeated pike charges and mass volleys slowly drove the Imperials back.  
While the decisive stroke of the battle was a cavalry flank that captured, and turned 
the Imperial guns on Imperial Tercios and drove into the rear of the Imperial army.  
Historian Paul K. Davis stated that “the victory was one of the maneuverability of 
the Swedish units vs the size and weight of the tercio.”7  He further stated: 
“Conversely, it was a victory of the weight of Swedish firepower.”8  Adolphus II 
was able to effectively increase the Swedish army’s mobility and firepower by 
reforming its tactical structure, giving them a decisive edge on the battlefield.  
Considering the circumstances that the Swedish military had to face at Breteinfield 
and Lutzen, it is remarkable that Adolphus II was able to successfully defeat armies 
commanded by experienced commanders, such as Tilly, the Imperial commander 
at Breteinfield having started his military career roughly 60 years prior, in 1574.  
The Imperial armies of Breteinfield and Lutzen were comprised of veteran 
commanders, yet both were defeated by the significantly more mobile and powerful 
Swedish forces.  
 
Gustavus Adolphus II's reforms stressed the development of professionalism, 
mobility, and offensive power, which resulted in victories at Breitenfield and 
Lutzen.  His smaller, more flexible infantry formations could deliver more powerful 
strikes, eventually leading to the Swedish army’s victory at Breitenfield.  Gustavus 
Adolphus II has been described as the “Lion of the North,” he was perhaps more 
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telling the creator of a “Northern Lion,” a quick, sharp clawed animal that was the 
Swedish army.9  The foundation that Adolphus II laid out has become the most 
basic principles that define the victorious from the defeated.  Professionalism, 
mobility, and offensive capability are the hallmarks of an effective army.  The 
blitzkrieg, which specializes in fast and powerful attacks by aircrafts, tanks, and 
artillery working in combination is a striking example of the changes Adolphus II 
introduced to the military.  This tactic soon became Swedish military’s blueprint 
for success. 
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